Economic Determinants of the Natural Fertility Rate with Special Focus on the EU and on Hungary by Pintér, Tibor
301
Civic Review, Vol. 15, Special Issue, 2019, 301–316, DOI: 10.24307/psz.2020.0217
Tibor Pintér
Economic Determinants of the 
Natural Fertility Rate with 
Special Focus on the EU and 
on Hungary
Summary
The natural fertility rate directly expresses the reproductive capabilities of a coun-
try. Typically, the value of this indicator is considerably lower in the economically 
developed part of the world than in less developed countries. However, in terms of 
fertility rates, developed countries are not completely homogenous either, at least in 
an analysis of changes in time series. Through the example of various EU Member 
States, this study aims to pick the economic and policy factors that may trigger im-
provement in the fertility rate. Apart from a few countries, it is a common problem in 
the surveyed states that population growth is insufficient for ensuring reproduction. 
Paradoxically, population decline and ageing is a problem in those countries and 
regions of the world where the material, economic and welfare conditions are the 
most favourable. It is also important to demonstrate globally detectable correlations 
between fertility rates and the standard of living. The aim of this study is to highlight 
the specific social and economic indicators with the most beneficial and most adverse 
impacts on developments in fertility rates. An important finding of the study is that 
having children is essentially not an economic, much rather a cultural matter that is 
closely related to the concept of responsibility, and in addition, economic stability or 
a balanced income distribution may increase the fertility rate. Overall, decrease in the 
intensity of childbearing can be considered as a legitimate concomitant of societies 
with advanced economies. In the study references are made to other variables that 
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may shift the unfavourable demographic trends in a more favourable direction in the 
developed world.
Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes: J10, J13, F63, I15
Keywords: fertility rate, economic development, social assistance, ageing, income 
growth
Introduction 
This study aims to identify the economic determinants of fertility rate. It is common 
knowledge that the insufficient number of children usually poses a serious problem 
exactly in countries with ample economic resources. Childbearing and family support 
are also emphatic in today’s Hungarian public debates. On the one hand, this can 
be seen as a very welcome development and a sign that the political leadership has 
realised the increasing challenge this issue poses in the developed world. However, 
more emphasis should be placed on the cultural, personal and emotional aspects 
of this problem, and the latter are just as important in a decision to start a family as 
financial considerations are. Surveys, databases and everyday experience suggest that 
a clearly positive emotional and ideological motivation underlies every decision to 
start a family. 
Allow me to only point out two correlations to prove that finances will not solve 
the fertility crisis on a global scale. Based on the relevant 2016 data published by the 
World Bank, nearly 85 per cent of the world’s population live below the average Hun-
garian’s standard of living. In spite of this, in Hungary the fertility rate is considerably 
below the world average and the natural reproductive value.
Similar data is related to time trends. In 1960, the fertility rate of an average earth-
ling was nearly 5, with approximately 450 USD per capita GDP. In 2016 (56 years 
later), a fertility rate of 2.44 is coupled with USD 10,200 per capita GDP. This is not to 
say that a fertility rate of 5 is desirable, but the trend is more than though-provoking.
However, this study does not have such a distressing message. The group of eco-
nomically highly developed countries, namely the 28 Member States of the European 
Union, give a more intricate picture.
Theoretical overview and research questions
In its early stages, economics addressed the matters and areas affected by economic 
developments more naturally. The implementation of an economic system capable 
of creating the material needs of a decent family life can be considered such an area. 
Although the current economic system has created extraordinary riches, it does not 
at all support family life. In this respect this economic system has failed. Naturally, this 
failure is not a bolt from the blue.
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Following the early economic theories covering a broad horizon, the classical 
school of economics (hallmarked by Adam Smith) systematically organised the con-
ceptual and methodological toolbox of this academic field (Mueller, 2010). However, 
this development isolated the representatives of this discipline and encouraged them 
to specialise. Since then, only theoretical economists working in various specific fields 
have been dealing with, say, the demographic aspects and demographic sustainability 
of the economic system. Within this scope, mention must be made of the work of 
Thomas Robert Malthus, who suggested in his book, originally published in 1798, that 
the population growth rate and the potential of economic performance should be 
compared. His conclusion that global population growth would be permanently high-
er than economic growth was, of course, incorrect. Regardless of this fact,  it should 
be pointed out that massive population growth is not characteristic in areas where one 
would expect it on the basis of economic performance and the standard of living. The 
longer the time series, the stronger discrepancies can be found in this research area.
The correlation between a variable considered important in any academic disci-
pline and the population and demographic developments gives rise to the question 
whether the fertility rate is a suitable indicator as a dependent variable. A review of 
the relevant literature has shown that in most cases this indicator can indeed be used 
as a dependent variable in various models (Becker, 1960; Berde and Németh, 2016).
Another important question is whether there is any relation between the level 
of economic development and the fertility rate. Although GDP and SNA indicators 
are frequently criticised in economic analyses, in most cases, demographic trends are 
compared to GDP or an indicator derived from it (Berde and Kuncz, 2017). In an eco-
nomic historical perspective, there is a definitely adverse correlation between income 
levels and fertility; and specific fertility-related theories have emerged to explain this 
phenomenon, but they have been unable to give a satisfactory answer (Jones and 
Schoonbroodt, 2010).
Another important trend in the economic analysis of fertility, inspired by econom-
ic history, includes the efforts made at identifying the level of economic development 
where the dynamics of fertility breaks and the way demographic development is re-
lated to the series of economic transitions. The need to map correlation between eco-
nomic transition and the fertility rate arises in highly developed regions (Prskawetz 
and Lindh, 2007), in isolated areas with medium income levels (Mason et al., 2010), 
and in bigger countries with low development levels (Hussain et al., 2009). The recent 
serious global economic crisis has also had a controversial impact on the world’s most 
developed regions (Sobotka et al., 2011).
The assessment of a correlation between the demographic developments, eco-
nomic performance and the standard of living (Berde and Kovács, 2016) is genuinely 
important in the case of countries that are considered well-developed in a global com-
parison and have extensive welfare systems and functioning social security systems 
(Sági et al., 2018), because (as shown in the charts below) the willingness to have 
children is typically much lower in these regions of the world. In addition, the cor-
relation between the two phenomena is not explicitly highly adverse in this income 
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range, but there is a weak positive correlation. In any case, it can be concluded that a 
sort of alternative value system is built up in the more developed societies in relation 
to childbirth (Schultz, 1974).
The directions of intervention and the opportunities of fiscal policy and active 
state involvement also emerge as major research questions in this context (Yang, 
2016). Even though there are differences between the various pension systems, it is 
important to note that the lower number of children and the accompanying phe-
nomenon of ageing are alarming trends that will need to be addressed in the future 
(Széll, 2010). Both the academic and the political stakeholders need to deal with the 
available implementation opportunities.
A direct financial correlation can be established between having children, starting 
a family and the social security system (Giday and Szegő, 2018). Economic growth has 
a clearly favourable impact on the life expectancy of a country’s population but this 
does not mean that improvement in health is necessary for starting a family (Barro, 
2013). Thus, at a later stage, it may be worthwhile to explore the interrelationship be-
tween health and economic performance, as well as the correlation between certain 
civilization diseases and economic performance. It is worth noting that during my 
other surveys I found a very strong positive correlation between the ratio of popula-
tion with cancer and economic development, however, the exploration of this correla-
tion falls outside the scope of the present study.
As a special question (for example, in the context of sociological and regional 
studies), the exploration of the territorial context of fertility may also be important 
(Varga, 2005). In a country or other territorial unit, it is exactly the younger popula-
tion willing to start a family who often move to more prosperous areas (Sági and Lent-
ner, 2018). Many of them do not ultimately have the previously planned number of 
children, precisely because of the newly adopted attitudes. There is a rationale behind 
research in countries with similar development historical heritage and similar roles in 
the international division of labour. For this very reason, Farkas (2017) compares the 
functioning of the family support systems in Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia 
and draws conclusions with respect to the Hungarian system.
It is also worth highlighting the controversial relationship between the labour mar-
ket participation and qualification of women and fertility rates (Yang, 2000). Accord-
ingly, there is a clearly adverse correlation between women’s active participation in the 
labour market and fertility, however, this correlation is not so clear in the developed 
parts of the world. In the range below the natural reproductive level, there is a posi-
tive correlation between active female participation in the labour market and the will-
ingness to have children. The special theoretical economic categories and variables 
such as unemployment and its social consequences, including the psychological basis 
of the attitude towards having children, can also show a correlation with each other 
(Kucséber, 2011). Thus, a person living in a more developed country may feel that 
losing a job is a sufficient reason to postpone having children. However, based on the 
databases, this is more of a sociological and psychological consideration, since glob-
ally a higher standard of living clearly reverses the fertility rate.
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In this study efforts are made at demonstrating correlations solely between data 
and nothing else. Naturally, this presupposes the knowledge of the most important 
types of empirical methods. The relevant Hungarian literature has also undergone 
significant development in recent years. The basic tables were compiled and the anal-
yses were conducted primarily on the basis of the work of Molnár (2015). However, a 
book published by Dusek and Kotosz in 2016 has provided an excellent complementa-
tion, especially by a more sophisticated, elaborate interpretation and data collection.
It is worth reviewing the magnitude of differences in economic development and 
in fertility rates between the large regions of the world. Instead of merely drawing a 
static cross-section of the present, it is worth including the temporal changes in fertil-
ity and economic development over time. Following this, however, focus falls on the 
EU Member States, where the reliability of statistical systems may be higher and which 
are in a similar social and economic situation to Hungary. The most important eco-
nomic determinants of fertility are identified through direct economic, sociological 
and regional economic variables. Mostly, the regression model analysis and correla-
tion matrixes are used to highlight the main directions and relationships.
Correlation between the financial standard of living 
and fertility rates in a global perspective
It is important to demonstrate the correlation between the economic standard of liv-
ing and fertility rate. Despite its known weaknesses, per capita GDP is used to measure 
the economic standard of living. The first chart gives a summary of GDP per capita 
and fertility rates in all the countries of the world in a scatter diagram. The number of 
sample elements is less than the number of countries, because only countries where 
both data are available for 2016 have been added to the model.
The following chart shows a negative correlation between GDP per capita and the 
fertility rate. This correlation is not linear, but rather gives an exponential shape.
The Chart 1 gives a static, cross-sectional correlation between the two data in the 
same calendar year 2016. The correlation coefficient in the chart shows the accuracy 
of matching the cloud of points containing real data to the hypothetical logarithmic 
model. According to the additional model calculations performed by the SPSS pro-
gram, the results of both the logarithmic regression model and the correlation model 
are significant. The value of the Pearson correlation indicator is –0.488, which gives 
a negative, but not particularly high correlation between GDP per capita and the 
fertility rate. It is important to note that in terms of GDP per capita (shown on the 
horizontal axis to show the extent to which the standard of living defines fertility and 
the dependence of the latter on the former), the points are characterized by different 
locations. It is clearly visible that in the case of poorer countries, a higher fertility rate 
of 3 or more is fairly common, while in richer countries a value higher than 2 or 2.5 is 
rarely found for the same, and values below 2 are more typical.
In 2016, Niger’s fertility rate was the highest at 7.24 (rounded to two decimal plac-
es), followed by two other African countries: Somalia and the Democratic Republic of 
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Chart 1: Correlation between fertility rates and GDP per capita in the world’s countries, 2016 
R2 = 0.5975
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Congo, both with values well over 6. South Korea had the lowest measured value in 
the world in 2016: 1.117, followed by Singapore and Hong Kong, both with very low 
indicators around 1.2. Within the group having GDP over 20 000 USD per person, 
only Guam and Israel have a fertility rate above 2, the latter with a value above 3. This 
supplement illustrates a higher negative correlation than the indicators, and moreo-
ver, the overall population is more concentrated in countries falling in lower income 
categories, i.e. countries with large populations fall into this income group.
In addition to the analysis of the situation in a given time, a time series analysis is 
also important. This second model analyses the correlation between the fertility rate 
and GDP per capita of an average citizen of the world. Chart 2 shows the evolution of 
these two indicators per annum in the period between 1960 and 2016. The negative 
correlation between the movements of the two variables is clearly higher.
This chart shows a negative exponential correlation, with the real data almost 
matching the hypothetical function (R2=0.9727, a very strong link in a quasi social 
and economic analysis). The correlation is also high: the rate (Pearson’s coefficient) is 
–0.897. According to SPSS, the correlation is also significant if the value is 1 per cent. 
Thus it can be stated without any hesitation that the rapid rise in the standard of liv-
ing seen in the past few decades has adversely affected development in fertility rates. 
Although the trend of overpopulation continues, the global fertility rate is getting 
closer to the value of 2. However, the chart suggests that decrease in fertility is slowing, 
and decline is far from the massive drop seen in the middle of the period. Another 
important conclusion is that although the term “population explosion” is not directly
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Chart 2:  Correlation between fertility rates and GDP per capita, based on average values per 
person, 1960–2016
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used to refer to the past few decades, at least in the Western world, it should rather be 
replaced by “economic explosion” to describe this period, since the average standard 
of living has increased twenty-fold in 56 years, adjusted for population growth.
Correlation between the fertility rate and its economic 
determinants in the 28 Member States of the European Union
In terms of global development, it can be concluded that overall, there is a negative cor-
relation between the standard of living and the fertility rate. A stronger negative effect 
is reflected in the time series, i.e. decline in the fertility rate is clearly associated with im-
provement in the economic development. However, in addition to a dynamic approach, 
the static model, which includes the analysis of a single year, showed a lower correlation 
in a similar direction. In both cases, the correlations were considered significant. In light 
of this, the result of the model where the scope of observation units was limited to the 
current 28 Member States of the European Union can be considered rather surprising.
This chapter describes the result of an analysis of the correlation between 19 eco-
nomic variables and the fertility rate. An effort was made at selecting the variables that 
have a high level of measurement and include welfare, stability, sociological and ter-
ritorial (regional economic) criteria. The following variables were included: GDP per 
capita, ratio of urban population, employment rate, GINI coefficient, ratio of R&D ex-
penditures to GDP in exports, number of hours worked per week, ratio of population 
living in metropolitan areas, unemployment rate, ratio of internet users within the 
population, CPI (corruption perception index), Bertelsmann Sustainable Govern-
ance Indicators, Happy Planet Index, ratio of domestic loan to GDP, final consump-
tion expenditure to GDP, household consumption to GDP, military expenditure to 
GDP, ratio of non-performing bank loans, ratio of net public social transfers to GDP.
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Of all the variables, the following table only includes the significant correlation 
coefficients. Nevertheless, in the explanation, the direction of non-significant vari-
ables is also included.
Table 1:  Correlation coefficients in the fertility rate and the significant economic variables 
(mostly 2016)
Included economic variable Correlation with the fertility rate
GDP per capita 0.395*
Employment rate 0.544**
R&D exp 2014 0.455*
Hours worked –0.442*
Unemployment –0.394*
Internet users 0.479**
CPI 0.548**
Bertelsmann Sust 0.398*
Bank nonperforming loan –0.438*
Source: Author’s calculation based on data from the World Bank and Eurostat
Based on the above table and on other information, certain conclusions can be 
drawn about the fertility rate and its economic determinants. The table shows the 
Pearson correlation coefficients, which indicate the closeness and direction of the 
correlation per pair. One asterisk indicates that the value of the two-tailed significance 
is valid within the 5-percent interval, while two asterisks denote validity within 1 per 
cent, in other words, validity is even higher in the latter range. As none of the values 
is exceptionally high, it cannot be condfirmed that they are strong economic determi-
nants of the fertility rate.
In an absolute value, the CPI (the corruption perception index) and the employ-
ment rate have the highest numerical values. Both show positive correlations. In light 
of the method of creating these indicators, the conclusion arises that the less corrupt 
a society is (the value of the indicator increases if corruption is not perceived or less 
perceived), the more positive shift can be expected in fertility. In addition to the ab-
sence of corruption (which may naturally be measured with an excessively normative 
content), the employment rate of a country has also proved to be decisive (maitaining 
that neither of the coefficients is particularly high). This can be construed in a way that 
active participation in the labour market functions as a kind of an existential basis to 
underpin the willingness to have children. A higher ratio of internet users and a more 
pronounced presence of R&D-intensive products within exports show a lower but posi-
tive correlation. This suggests that the level of scientific/academic development and 
qualification can indirectly improve fertility rates in the case of a country with a high 
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standard of living. Globally, the exact opposite can be seen for these variables; however, 
limiting our analysis to developed countries reverses the direction of the correlation.
GDP per capita and the Sustainable Governance Indicator of the Bertelsmann 
Institute show positive correlations of similar strength. Especially the former one is 
a surprise, given that globally, both in a given year and in the time series, GDP per 
capita has a clearly negative correlation with fertility. In the 28 Member States of the 
EU, however, there is a slightly positive correlation between fertility and the standard 
of living. Consequently, in the case of an EU Member State, fincncial incentives to 
support having children cannot be considered needless, at least if the fertility rate falls 
between 1 and 2. This result contradicts the preliminary research expectation that the 
EU would also have the usual adverse trend.
Only three of all the significant variables show a negative correlation with the fer-
tility rate. These are the number of hours worked, the ratio of non-performing bank 
loans to the total loans, and the unemployment rate. The more time people spend at 
work; the lower fertility rate is reported. This seems to be self-evident, however, as the 
correlation with employment is positive, it is important to draw the attention to the 
fact that the barrier to childbearing is not employment in itself, but poorly organised, 
unmanageable work and long working hours. Consequently, flexible working hours 
and efficient work should be set as immanent objectives in legislation and manage-
ment. This could further resolve the conflict between work and family.
Despite the fact that, representing a non-characteristic correlation, the indicator 
of non-performing loans remains below 0.5 in an absolute value, it is still necessary 
to explain this variable. It suggests that the willingness to have children is reduced by 
insufficiently covered private-sector loans. This correlation shows similarities to what 
has already been explained above, namely that existential security is at risk not olny 
if a person does not have secure employment but also when revenues are insufficient 
to finance debt payment. Therefore, it is worth considering that support to fertility 
should be conceptually linked with improving the financial literacy and providing a 
stable financial system in a country. This is only confirmed by previous analyses not 
covered in this study, like those related to risk factors (e.g. the EOS risk factor of 
the World Economic Forum) in certain countries, which have shown that relieving a 
country from risk factors has a beneficial impact on the fertility path.
Non-significant correlations exhibited the following trends: The ratio of urban 
population and the ratio of population in metropolitan areas have a very slight posi-
tive correlation with fertility. The GINI coefficient shows a low negative correlation 
with fertility, i.e. unequal income distribution is more likely to discourage having chil-
dren. The Happy Planet Index has a neutral value (0.052), while the ratio of loans, 
household and end-user consumption, and military expenditures, and the ratio of net 
public social transfers to GDP all adversely affect fertility. Thus, the expansion of the 
social welfare system alone is not a particularly important factor, while consumption 
has more of an adverse effect. A comparison of the ratio of family support expendi-
ture to GDP (only OECD data are available for OECD countries, so the basic model 
changes) reveals a very low positive correlation coefficient at 0.06.
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Developments in the fertility rate in Hungary 
and its economic background
In Hungary the incumbent government places great emphasis on demography. The 
most recent cornerstone in the relevant policy actions is the 7-point family protection 
action plan announced in February 2019. The presented fertility rates also justify that 
the Member States of the European Union, including Hungary, are generally char-
acterised by extremely low fertility rates, and this alone jeopardises the sustainability 
of the social and economic system. Various concepts, either using external resources 
or merely by improving the productivity of the internal population, have been set up 
for solving this crisis and in public discourse the key role of economic policy acions in 
the provision of a solution is called into question. Although these are not insignificant 
questions, as they are not strictly economic, they fall outside the scope of this study.
In an analysis of developments in the Hungarian fertility rate, it needs to be noted 
as a preliminary point that Hungary has also been unable to detach itself from the 
European trend of declining fertility rates with improvement in the standard of living. 
This statement is not as simple as it may seem at first sight, because it is only true if the 
standard of living is expressed in the internationally accepted SNA indicators. In this 
study GDP per capita is used at purchasing power parity to express welfare. Naturally, 
certain questions are not addressed at the moment, including: What is the relation-
ship between the two categories if real wages are taken into consideration? What is the 
relationship if growth financed from indebtedness or foreign capital is distinguished 
from growth based on internal resources? The experiences of the past few years sug-
gest that people tend to make decisions, among others on having children, more on 
the basis of such economic parameters perceivable in daily life..
The following chart shows the evolution of the fertility rate of Hungary after 1942. 
The indicator had clearly decreased from a rate above 2 to a rate below 2 already by 
1970, with the lowest rate at 1.23 in 2011, followed by gradual increase in the fertility 
rate to 1.49 in 2017.
Chart 3 depicts a social and economic historical transition in Hungary from tra-
ditional values to a preference for a high standard of living considered worth giving 
up even demographical sustainability. The above firm political will and the aforemen-
tioned claim that a slightly positive correlation is demonstrable between GDP per 
capita and fertility in countries with a higher standard of living somewhat sophisti-
cates the Hungarian situation. 
Béla Tomka writes in his book published in 2016 that in the cross-hairs of Hungar-
ian society and politics Austria has played an important role as a benchmark. Below 
the Hungarian state of affairs is compared to the Austrian standard of living rather 
than to the average of the EU (although the latter would show a similar trend). The 
following chart presents developments in GDP per capita at purchasing power parity 
and in the fertility rate in Hungary after the change of regime, relative to Austria. 
Theoretically, this was an important benchmark for the Hungarian society and also 
the Hungarian political elite. Chart 4 has too vertical axes: the left one measures de-
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Chart 3: Fertility rates in Hungary, 1941–2017
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velopments in Hungarian GDP per capita as a percentage of the corresponding Aus-
trian figures, while the right one measures developments in the fertility rate. Only the 
years between 1991 and 2017 are analysed because the World Bank has only published 
SNA-indicator statistics for the former socialist countries since 1990.
The chart illustrates that relative to Austria, Hungary now has a higher standard of 
living than at the beginning of the 1990’s. Due to reasons mentioned above, closing the 
gap is perhaps not readily perceived, and in addition, similarly to the other European 
countries, there are significant regional differences in convergence. Also note that after 
2011 increase in the fertility rate was associated with a catch-up in the standard of livin.
Chart 5 highlights the unclear correlation between the fertility rate and the stand-
ard of living. Based on a time-series analysis, the question arises how GDP per capita 
and fertility rates develop after 1990.
The regression monogenic takes the form of a polynomial chart, and the cloud of 
points moderately matches the hypothetical regression line. The conclusion drawn 
from this chart is none different from the previous ones: at the beginning of the pe-
riod reviewed, the fertility rate decreases in the wake of GDP growth, and then, after 
a certain point, it increases. In an excessively theoretical field, it may be concluded 
that having reached a certain per capita GDP, the Hungarian economy has entered 
ther range of low positive correlation between rise in the standard of living in an eco-
nomic sense and fertility rate. Departing from the meaning of the model, reference 
needs to be made to the fact that the transformations that followed the change of
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Chart 4: Standard of living in Hungary, as a percentage of the SoL in Austria 
1
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
1.7
1.8
1.9
2
30
35
40
45
50
55
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
20
14
20
15
20
16
20
17
Hungarian living standard in Austria % Fertility rate
Source: Based on the data of Central Statistical Office of Hungary and World Bank
Chart 5: Regression monogenic between the fertility rate and GDP per capita after 1990
y = 3E– –09x2 0.0001x + 2.4664
R2 = 0.6699
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regime and the shift in social values might also have had a serious impact on demog-
raphy, and then the experiences gained about the new regime and the altered govern-
ment policy could shift the demographic trend in a more favourable direction.
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These are evidenced by the findings of a survey conducted among Hungarian uni-
versity students by Sági et al. (2017). More than a thousand interviewed students clear-
ly expressed favourable opinions on the Hungarian family support system, including 
financial support and transfers. The overwhelming majority of the respondents con-
sidered the fiscal policy incentives beneficial for having children. Another research 
also pointed out that the family support and home creation aid applied in Hungary is 
sustainable over the longer term (Tatay et al., 2019).
Table 2: Differences between various NUTS 2 regions in Hungary
Region
2001 2005 2010 2015 2017
GDP 
average%
Live 
births/1000 
residents
GDP 
average 
%
Live 
births/1000 
residents
GDP 
aver age 
%
Live 
births/1000 
residents
GDP 
aver age 
%
Live 
births/1000 
residents
GDP 
average, 
%
Live 
births/1000 
residents
Central 
HU.
157.7   9.1 162.4   9.9 165.8 9.8 153.5   9.4 152.9   9.2
Central 
Trans-
danubia
  92.5   9.1   94   9.3 86.6 8.7   93.1   9.1 92.3   9
Western 
Trans-
danubia
102.3   8.7   98.9   9 99 8.2 107.9   8.3 105.6   8.5
Southern 
Trans-
danubia
  73.2   9.1   69   9.1 67.5 8.2   64.9   8.5 66.3   8.5
Northern 
HU
  65.7 10.1   66.2   9.8 60.1 9.2   66.3   9.9 67.4 10.4
Northern 
Great 
Plain
  68 10.8   64.4 10.3 63.4 9.1   63.7 10.1 63.5 10.2
Southern 
Great 
Plain
  73.8   9   68.9   9 64.8 8   71.7   8.6 71.2   8.9
Source: Based on the data of Central Statistical Office of Hungary 
Table 2 shows developments in live births per 1000 residents in the 7 NUTS-2 re-
gions in Hungary. As clearly visible, while live births give different rates in different 
years, the economic sequence of regions shows a stable picture. The Pearson correla-
tion indicator of these 7 regions gives the following data for the years reviewed: –0.4587; 
0.1439; 0.5434; –0.1372; –0.283. In addition to the rates, the precursor also changes. In 
2001, 2015 and in 2017 we can see a negative correlation between the standard of living 
and births (in 2001 it is medium), while in 2005 and 2010 this correlation is positive 
(in 2010 it is medium). Consequently, in certain years the number of births is higher 
with ssimilarly high welfare indicators, while in others the number of births is higher 
despite lower standard of living. Although more reliable results are obtained in deeper 
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territorial levels, or even on a county level, at present the focus of the number of births 
is not necessarily at the place where economic indicators would justify.
In a global and a European perspective, Hungary belongs to the group of countries 
with a positive correlation between the standard of living in the economic sense and the 
fertility rate. For this reason, it is worth to take policy actions to support the financial 
aspects of childbearing. This is also confirmed by the recent improvement in the fertility 
rate in Hungary. Based on model calculations, the Hungarian family support model is 
sustainable also in terms of public finance. However, the globally negative correlation 
between the standard of living and the fertility rate, and the spatial processes within 
Hungary suggest that the factors underlying fertility also include factors beyond the 
economy (meta-economic factors). Certainly, a cultural and political stance against the 
concept of humans that can be associated with excessive individualisation may also be 
instrumental in achieving a more positive trend in this concept (Lentner et al., 2017).
Summary and conclusions
The most important objective of this study is to clarify whether there is a valid cor-
relation between development in the economic sense and the fertility rate. The con-
clusions drawn from the research findings show a controversial relationship. On the 
one hand, the fertility rate is high in countries where the standard of living is low, or 
at least below the average. This negative correlation between the two variables is only 
confirmed by a rapid decline in the fertility rate since the 1960’s, parallel with a reapid 
rise in average GDP per capita. Thus in a global context, increase in the standard of 
living results in a decline in fertility. Naturally, it cannot be predicted to what extent 
the fertility rate will continue to decline, perhaps the trend will slow as it approaches 
the value 2, or at least this conclusion arises from the analysis of the current path.
However, in the Member States of the European Union the correlation between 
the standard of living and fertility rate is surprisingly different: at a point the correla-
tion takes a positive direction, although it must be added that the detectable positive 
correlation is not high. In this group of developed countries, almost without an ex-
ception, there is a problem with biological regeneration, i.e. without a positive migra-
tion balance, their population declines. Under these conditions, in the context of 
economic development, the absence of corruption, employment and social and eco-
nomic openness to novelties, the reviewed data shows a positive correlation with the 
fertility rate. Accordingly, it may seem justified to support the dynamics of the fertility 
rate in a country by the corresponding financial incentives. This does not mean that 
there are no other, more powerful means to achieve this goal but – contrary to the 
author’s expectations – there is some room for manoeuvre for the financial support 
of the fertility rate: labour market predictability and a household income sufficient to 
cover the expenses seem to stimulate fertility. However, it should also be pointed out 
that an analysis over a longer timeframe may be justified, and that this model leaves 
the overall demographic picture of the 28 EU Member States unchanged. Low fertility 
is also a major problem in other developed areas from North America to Southeast 
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Asia. The question may also arise whether people in developed societies overestimate 
the economic implications of having children or undertake unnecessarily excessive 
financial burdens to guarantee their upbringing and careers. This might be a rightful 
conjecture, and yet it seems that at the current standard of living having children does 
indeed have serious financial implications. Moreover, in addition to financial needs, 
requirements related to risk reduction, the stability of the institutional system and 
the maintenance of a welfare system also arise when it comes to supporting fertility in 
these countries, including of cours Hungary (although not necessarily by the classical 
means as the values shown by OECD countries reveal).
The complexity of the issue naturally requires a more complex approach. Socio-
logical and psychological parameters suitable for capturing considerations beyond an 
individual’s life-span, isolated interests and perception of usefulness should also be 
included in subsequent studies. As John D. Mueller suggests, transcendence and re-
ligious belief may be very important factors in supporting fertility (weekly church at-
tendance shows the strongest correlation with fertility in the federal states of the US), 
and the existence and reinforcement of the positive and modern self-image and iden-
tity of a country – and as a higher quality, a nation, may possibly also serve this purpose.
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